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Abstract
The Hylland-Zeckhauser (HZ) rule is a well-known rule for probabilistic as-
signment of items. The complexity of the rule has received renewed interest
recently with Vazirani and Yannakakis (2020) proposing a strongly polynomial-
time algorithm for the rule under bi-valued utilities, and making several general
insights. We study the rule under the case of agents having bi-valued utilities.
We point out several characterizations of the HZ rule, drawing clearer relations
with several well-known rules in the literature. As a consequence, we point
out alternative strongly polynomial-time algorithms for the HZ solution. We
also give reductions from computing the HZ solution to computing well-known
solutions based on leximin or Nash social welfare. An interesting contrast is
that the HZ rule is group-strategyproof whereas the unconstrained competitive
equilibrium with equal incomes rule is not even strategyproof. We also clarify
which results change when moving from 1-0 binary utilities to the more general
bi-valued utilities.
Keywords: Fair Division, Computational Complexity, Competitive
Equilibrium with Equal Incomes
JEL: C62, C63, and C78
1. Introduction
Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes (CEEI) is one of the most
fundamental solution concepts in resource allocation [7, 14, 16]. The concept is
based on the idea of a market-based equilibrium which underpins classical eco-
nomics and has been referred to as the crown jewel of mathematical economics.
In CEEI, each agent is considered to have equal budget of unit one to spend.
An assignment of items satisfies CEEI if, for some price vector for the items, the
supply meets demand. In other words, the agents get allocations that give them
the maximum possible utility. CEEI is a well-established in economics because
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it is based on the idea of a market equilibrium. It is an attractive solution
concept because it implies envy-freeness and Pareto optimality.
We consider the problem of allocating n items among n agents. Agents
have linear cardinal utilities over the items. If we view the items as divisible
and do not impose any limits on the amount of items given to agents, then
CEEI is well-understood. Under additive utilities, CEEI is equivalent to max-
imizing Nash social welfare. The equivalence follows from an analysis of the
Eisenberg-Gale convex program that maximizes the Nash welfare within the set
of divisible items. However, such a characterization disappears when each agent
has a demand for exactly one unit of items. The constraint of unit capacities is
especially critical when the fractions of items given to agents are interpreted as
probabilities and the goal is to probabilistically find an assignment in which each
agent gets one item. If each agent gets one unit of items, then the given prob-
abilistic assignment can be instantiated into a lottery over perfect matchings
using Birkhoff’s theorem.
In this paper, we focus on the pseudo-market rule proposed by Hylland and
Zeckhauser [11] that is inspired by CEEI. We will refer to the rule as the HZ rule.
HZ can be viewed as the suitable CEEI solution for probabilistic assignment of
indivisible items. 1The HZ rule has been referred to as CEEI in the literature.
We will not use the term CEEI for HZ so that it is clear that we assume unit-
demand requirement when referrering to the HZ solution. The complexity of
computing the HZ solution has been open for 40 years. For example, it was
mentioned as open by Sethuraman [15]. Recently, Vazirani and Yannakakis
[18] explored the computational complexity of the HZ rule. They make several
general insights including the fact that the HZ solution can be irrational. They
present a strongly polynomial-time algorithm to compute the HZ solution under
bi-valued utilities.
Contributions. We also focus on the case of bi-valued utilities. We prove sev-
eral characterizations of the HZ rule, drawing clearer relations with several
well-known rules in the literature. As a consequence, we point out alterna-
tive strongly polynomial-time algorithms for the HZ solution. In particular, we
show that the Extended Probabilistic Serial (EPS) by Katta and Sethuraman
[12] (which is designed for egalitarian objectives) also returns the HZ solution.
Some of our key observations are based on the brilliant paper by Bogomol-
naia and Moulin [6]. For bi-valued utilities, we also provide a reduction from
computing the HZ rule to computing the leximin or maximum Nash welfare
solution. Another structural insight we have is the following one: for all HZ
solutions under bi-valued utilities, each item gets the same price in all the so-
lutions as long as the underlying dichotomous preferences do not change. We
also show the following interesting contrast. Under bi-valued utilities, the HZ
rule is group-strategyproof whereas the (unconstrained) CEEI rule is not even
strategyproof. Therefore, an innocuous-looking relaxation of the unit-demand
1There are several works on probabilistic assignment of items to agents [5, 3, 2, 13, 10, 12].
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requirement leads to completely different strategic properties. Our result regard-
ing the manipulability of the CEEI rule also implies that for bi-valued utilities,
the MNW rule of Caragiannis et al. [8] for indivisible goods is not strategyproof.
2. Preliminaries
An assignment problem is a triple (N,O, u) such that N = {1, . . . , n} is
the set of agents, O = {o1, . . . , on} is the set of items, and u = (u1, . . . , un)
is the utility profile which specifies for each agent i ∈ N utility function ui
where uij denotes the utility of agent i for item oj . We assume that for each
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, uij > 0 for some i ∈ N and for each i ∈ N , uij > 0 for some
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
A fractional assignment x is a (n×n) matrix [xij ] such that xij ∈ [0, 1] for all
i ∈ N , and oj ∈ O, and
∑
i∈N xij = 1 for all oj ∈ O. The value xij represents
the fraction of item oj being allocated to agent i. Each row xi = (xi1, . . . , xin)
represents the allocation of agent i. We will denote the set of all allocations by
A . An allocation xi is balanced if
∑
oj∈O
xij = 1. We will denote the set of all
balanced allocations by Ab. For any allocation xi, we will refer to
∑
oj∈O
xij as
the size of the allocation. The set of columns correspond to the items o1, . . . , on.
A fractional assignment is discrete if xij ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and oj ∈ O. Let
the set of all fractional assignments be F . A fractional assignment is balanced
if
∑
oj∈O
xij = 1 for all i ∈ N . Let the set of all balanced fractional assignments
be Fb.
The expected utility received by agent i from assignment x is ui(xi) =∑
oj∈O
xijuij .
We say that the utility functions are binary or 1-0 if uij ∈ {0, 1} for all
i, j ∈ N . We say that the utility functions are bi-valued if for all i, uij ∈
{αi, βi} where αi > βi ≥ 0. Both binary and bi-valued preferences are forms of
dichotomous preferences. We will denote by Di the set of items most preferred
by agent i. For any bi-valued utility function involving values αi, βi, we call
by binary-reduced those utility functions in which αi is turned into 1 and βi is
turned into zero.
An assignment x is Pareto optimal (PO) if there exists no other assignment
y such that ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N and ui(yi) > ui(xi) for some i ∈ N . An
assignment x is Pareto optimal among balanced assignments if there exists no
balanced assignment y such that ui(yi) ≥ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N and ui(yi) > ui(xi)
for some i ∈ N .
We present a simple routine to turn an unbalanced assignment into a bal-
anced one. We will refer to it as the balancing operation.
Balancing operation. If an assignment is not balanced, we consider sets N+ =
{i ∈ N :
∑
oj∈O
xij > 1} and N− = {i ∈ N :
∑
oj∈O
xij < 1}. Each agent i ∈ N+
gives away the least preferred items from her allocation so as to ensure that her
allocation xi has size 1. The donated items are then given to N
− arbitrarily to
ensure that
∑
oj∈O
xij = 1 for all i ∈ N .
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3. Solution Concepts
We present a few prominent solution concepts starting with the HZ solution.
An assignment x is an HZ solution if x ∈ Fb and there exists a price vector
p = (p1, . . . , pn) that specifies the price pj of item oj such that the maximal share
that each i ∈ N can get with budget 1 is xi ∈ {x′i ∈ Ab : x
′
i ∈ argmax{ui(x
′
i) :∑
oj∈O
x′ij · (pj) ≤ 1}. We will refer to the rule that returns the HZ solution as
the HZ rule.
A closely related concept is CEEI. An assignment x satisfies competitve equi-
librium with equal incomes (CEEI) if there exists a price vector p = (p1, . . . , pn)
that specifies the price pj of item oj such that the maximal share that each i ∈ N
can get with budget 1 is xi ∈ {x′i ∈ A : x
′
i ∈ argmax{ui(x
′
i) :
∑
oj∈O
x′ij · (pj) ≤
1}}. The CEEI rule returns a CEEI assignment. CEEI [16] coincides with the
market equilibrium notion studied in [17]. Note that the HZ solution can be
viewed as CEEI with the additional constraint that each agent gets one unit of
items.
The MNW (Maximum Nash Welfare) rule returns an assignment x that
maximizes the Nash social welfare: x ∈ argmaxx′∈F
∏
i∈N ui(x
′
i).
For two vectors ~u,~v ∈ Rk, we say that ~u leximin-dominates ~v, written ~u ≻lex
~v, if there exists an i ≤ k such that ~uj = ~vj , for all j < i, and ~ui > ~vi. Finally,
π is leximin if there is no π′ such that ~u(π′) ≻lex ~u(π). The leximin rule is the
rule that returns a leximin optimal assignment.
CEEI, MNW, and leximin may not return a balanced assignment.
We will say that two rules are equivalent if they result in the same utilities
for the agents.
Example 1. Consider the following instance with two agents and items.
a b
1: 3 2
2: 1 0
For this instance, the HZ, MNW constrained to balanced assignments, and
the MNW solution are as follows.
HZ solution =
a b( )
1 1/2 1/2
2 1/2 1/2
MNW solution constrained to balanced assignments =
a b( )
1 0 1
2 1 0
CEEI = MNW solution =
a b( )
1 1/6 1
2 5/6 0
4
Leximin solution = Balanced Leximin =
a b( )
1 0 1
2 1 0
Note that if all the outcomes are balanced (as is the case under the HZ rule)
and an agent’s preferences are dichotomous, then an agent’s preferences over the
allocations only depends on the stochastic dominance relation over outcomes.
4. Bi-valued Utilities: Relations of HZ with other Rules and Algo-
rithms
Binary (1-0) utilities are a special class of utilities under which many rules
and algorithms coincide.
Fact 1. Under 1-0 utilities, the following rules are equivalent even if the number
of items is different than the number of agents:
(i) Leximin rule
(ii) Maximum Nash Welfare (MNW) rule
(iii) Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes (CEEI) [16]
(iv) Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm (CCEA)2 [4]
(v) Mechanism 1 of Chen et al. [9].
For example, CEEI and MNW are well-known to be equivalent even for
general additive utilities. Under binary utilities, all the rules were shown to be
equivalent [4]. Since the leximin rule gives rise to a unique utility profile (agents’
utilities do not change under different leximin outcomes), it follows that all the
rules above give rise to a unique utility profile. The rules above may not return
a balanced assignment even for 1-0 utilities. Therefore, they are most suitable
when the items are viewed as divisible.
Next we highlight the intimate connection between the HZ rule under bi-
valued utilities and the elegant Extended Probabilistic Serial (EPS) algorithm of
Katta and Sethuraman [12]. EPS is well-defined for any weak orders but we will
stick to its presentation for the case of dichotomous preferences. The running
time is O(n3 logn). Katta and Sethuraman [12] note that EPS for dichotomous
preferences is equivalent to the egalitarian rule studied by Bogomolnaia and
Moulin [6]. The egalitarian rule studied by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] is the
leximin rule applied to the set of balanced (unit-demand) assignemnts. Bogo-
molnaia and Moulin [6] studied the rule in the context of two-sided matching
2The Controlled Cake Eating Algorithm (CCEA) algorithm [4] and Mechanism 1 of Chen
et al. [9] are described in the context of cake cutting. They also apply to allocation of items:
each cake segment can be treated as a separate item.
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with men on one side and women on the other side. We adapt the presenta-
tion of Katta and Sethuraman [12] which is more algorithmic in nature and is
directly focussed on the assignment problem with one-sided preferences.
Extended Probabilistic Serial (EPS) for dichotomous preferences. For each
agent i, let Di denote the set of items most preferred by i. Agents gradu-
ally guarantee more and more fractional amount of liked items until agents
cannot guarantee more. At this point there is a bottleneck set of agents who
cannot fractionally get more amount of liked items. Let v = minC⊆N
|∪i∈CDi|
|C|
with X1 denoting the largest cardinality set X1 ⊆ N for which
|∪i∈X1Di|
|X1|
= v.
Such a bottleneck set can be computed via network flows as explained by Katta
and Sethuraman [12]. When we are allowed fractional allocations, then agents
in X1 can each get utility v. These agents X1 and the items that they like
O1 are removed from the market. The same process is recursively applied to
the remaining market until all items are allocated. Once all agents exit from
the market, then the remaining items are allocated among those agents who
got less than one unit of items to ensure that the allocation is balanced. Note
that each successive bottleneck set has a strictly higher utility guarantee v:
v1 < v2 < · · · < vk.
Next, we present a theorem which clarifies the relations between many rules.
Theorem 1. For 1-0 utilities, the following rules are equivalent.
(i) HZ rule
(ii) EPS rule
(iii) Egalitarian rule of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6]
(iv) Leximin applied to the set of balanced assignments
(v) MNW applied to the set of balanced assignments
(vi) The rule that applies the balancing operation to a leximin solution
(vii) The rule that applies the balancing operation to a MNW solution
(viii) The rule that applies the balancing operation to a CEEI solution.
Proof.
(ii) =⇒ (i):
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] proved that their egalitarian rule (leximin
solution) has a competitive rule interpretation for the two-sided matching
problem. From their Theorem 1, it follows that the egalitarian rule of
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] gives the HZ solution when one side can be
treated as items who are indifferent over the members of the other side. We
provide a direct proof for why the HZ solution under 1-0 utilities is implied
by the EPS rule. The direct proof is also useful in proving Theorem 2. Let
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Algorithm 1 EPS rule for dichotomous preferences
Input: (N,O, u) under 1-0 utilities
Output: A balanced assignment
1: N ′ ←− N ; O′ ←− O
2: k ←− 1
3: while N ′ 6= ∅ do
4: if each agent i ∈ N ′ can get one unit of items in Di ∩O
′ then
5: Give each agent i ∈ N ′ one unit of items from Di∩O′ [can be done via
an algorithm to compute a maximum size matching]
6: else
7: Let
vk = min
C⊆N ′
| ∪i∈C (Di ∩O′)|
|C|
with Xk denoting the largest cardinality set Xk ⊆ N ′ for which
|∪i∈Xk (Di∩O
′)|
|Xk|
= vk. Such a bottleneck set can be computed via network
flows as explained by Katta and Sethuraman [12]. Let ∪i∈Xk(Di ∩O
′)
be Ok.
8: Agents in Xk can each get utility vk by getting items from Ok. As-
signment x for agents in Xk is finalized. These agents Xk and the
items that they like Ok are removed from the market: N
′ ←− N ′ \X ′k;
O′ ←− O′ \Ok;
9: end if
10: k ←− k + 1
11: end while
12: For agents in {i ∈ N :
∑
oj∈O
xij < 1}, give them any remaining unallocated
items in O′ to ensure that the assignment x is balanced.
13: return x.
the EPS outcome be x. We compute the prices p of the items such that
xi ∈ {x′i ∈ Ab : x
′
i ∈ argmax{ui(x
′
i) :
∑
oj∈O
x′ij · (pj) ≤ 1}. Consider the
run of EPS on dichotomous preferences. When a set of agents Xk ⊆ N in
EPS becomes a bottleneck set and each agent gets utility v, we can set the
the individual prices of the goods allocated to agents in Xk to pj = 1/vk
for all oj allocated to the agents in Xk. Each agent in Xk at this point gets
an allocation that does not exceed size constraints. Moreover, it gets total
utility vk for items each of which cost 1/vk. An agent i ∈ Xk does not like
any items after items Ok are removed from O
′. It may most prefer items
that were removed before Ok were removed. However, those items have
even higher prices because the v value progressively becomes more with
the next bottleneck set and hence the prices keep going lower. Therefore
for each agent in Xk, the utility vk is the maximum utility that can be
achieved if i ∈ N was to buy liked items at their prices according to p.
For any extraneous items that are allocated in Step 12, they can get price
0. We have proved that (ii) implies (i).
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(i) =⇒ (viii)
Consider an HZ solution. Note that no agent pays anything for a zero
utility item because if it did, it can get a bit more of a one utility item.
Therefore, if an agent gets a zero utility item, its price is zero. We show
that there is a CEEI solution under the same prices. Consider all the
agents who get utility less than 1 in an HZ solution. For such agents,
the size constraint does not impact in specifying their demand set (best
possible feasible allocations within the budget). Now consider the agents
who get utility 1 in the HZ solution. Their demand set changes when
the size constraints are removed because they can avail additional items.
In the HZ solution, all such additional items are given to agents with
utility less than one to ensure than every agent has total amount one.
Hence, these additional items have zero price. We claim that there is a
CEEI outcome under the same prices. Each agent who gets utility less
than one in the HZ outcome clearly maximizes her utility even if the size
constraints are removed. The only agents who can get more utility under
the CEEI outcomes are the ones who got utility one in the HZ solution
but can benefit from zero price items. Therefore the market clears under
the same prices even if there are no size constraints. From Fact 1, it
follows all agents that get utility less than 1 in an HZ solution, will get
the same utility in a CEEI/leximin/MNW solution. As for agents who get
utility 1 in an HZ solution, they cannot get any more utility in a balanced
assignment.
(ii) ⇐⇒ (iii) ⇐⇒ (iv) ⇐⇒ (v):
The EPS rule of Katta and Sethuraman [12] returns a balanced random
assignment. Under dichotomous preferences, the EPS rule has a direct
connection with the egalitarian rule proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin
[6] for two-sided matching problem with equal number of men and women
with dichotomous preferences. If men are treated as items who are com-
pletely indifferent among women, then the setting studied by Bogomol-
naia and Moulin [6] reduces to the random assignment problem with one
side having dichotomous preferences and the EPS rule coincides with the
egalitarian rule of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6]. The egalitarian rule of
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] is equivalent to the leximin rule on the set of
balanced assignments. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] also note that their
egalitarian rule is equivalent to the MNW rule applied to the set of bal-
anced assignments (page 259). Thus the equivalence between (ii), (iii),
(iv), and (v) follows from the papers of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] and
Katta and Sethuraman [12].
(vi) ⇐⇒ (vii) ⇐⇒ (viii):
We also know from Fact 1 that under 1-0 utilities, MNW, CEEI, and
leximin coincide. Therefore, (vi), (vii), and (viii) are equivalent.
(ii) ⇐⇒ (vi):
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Consider an assignment x that is balanced and leximin among balanced
assignments. Suppose it is not globally leximin. Then observe how a
leximin assigment among balanced assignments is achieved during the run
of the EPS algorithm. For all agents in bottleneck sets who get utility
less than 1, their utilities are exactly the same as they would get in a
globally leximin random assignment. The reason x is not a globally leximin
assignment is that the last set of agents who exit the market get utility
1 but some of them could have got utility strictly more than 1 (without
decreasing the utility of other agents) if the balancedness condition is not
imposed. These items are not additionally allocated to the agents who
already have utility 1 and these items are only distributed in Step 12
of Algorithm 1. It follows that assignment x can be achieved by first
computing a balanced assignment that is leximin and then implementing
the balancing operation on it.
This completes the proof.
A corollary of the theorem above is the following one.
Corollary 1. For all HZ solutions under 1-0 utilities, each agent gets the same
utility in all the solutions and each item gets the same price in all the solutions.
Proof. We proved that under 1-0 utilities, the HZ solution is equivalent to ap-
plying the balancing operation to a CEEI solution. The utilities of each agent
in invariant under all CEEI solutions. Hence, it follows that the utilities of each
agent in invariant under all HZ solutions [17]. It also follows that the prices of
items are invariant under all HZ solutions.
Next, we present the following theorem for the case of bi-valued utilities.
Theorem 2. Under bi-valued utilities, the HZ rule is equivalent to
(i) EPS rule
(ii) Egalitarian rule of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] applied with respect to
the binary-reduced utilities
(iii) Leximin applied with respect to the binary-reduced utilities to the set of
balanced assignments
(iv) MNW applied with respect to the binary-reduced utilities to the set of bal-
anced assignments
(v) The rule that applies the balancing operation to a leximin solution (with
respect to the binary-reduced utilities)
(vi) The rule that applies the balancing operation to a MNW solution (with
respect to the binary-reduced utilities)
(vii) The rule that applies the balancing operation to a CEEI solution (with
respect to the binary-reduced utilities).
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Proof. We know from Theorem 1 that HZ and EPS are equivalent under 1-0
utilities. Note that EPS is an ordinal algorithm so it gives the same outcome
under dichotomous preferences. The same argument that is used to prove that
EPS gives an HZ solution under 1-0 utilities can be used verbtaim to prove that
EPS gives an HZ solution under bi-valued utilities. At any point at which a
bottleneck set Xk is removed, the agents in the set are able to get their most
preferred items at the lowest price. Any most preferred items that are not
available were sold at a higher price. As for lesser preferred items, they are
given to the agents for free because they are the under-demanded items that
are given price zero.
We have shown that HZ and EPS are equivalent under 1-0 utilities; EPS
solutions are equivalent under 1-0 utilities and bi-valued utilities; and EPS under
bi-valued utilities gives a HZ solution under bi-valued utilities. It follows that
HZ under 1-0 utilities implies HZ under bi-valued utilities.3
Next, we prove that any HZ solution under bi-valued utilities is the HZ so-
lution under binary-reduced utilities for the same item prices. Suppose there
is an HZ solution under bi-valued utilities that is not an outcome of HZ un-
der binary-reduced utilities. This means that the market does not clear under
binary-reduced utilities for the same prices. For the base case, consider the
items in O1 in the corresponding EPS outcome. The agents X1 pay nothing for
the lesser preferred items. If some item in O1 has a different price, then for the
market to clear, at least some item in O1 has lesser price. Consider the item
o ∈ O1 whose price dropped the most. But then all agents in X1 who most
prefer o want to get more of o which implies that the market does not clear.
The same argument works inductively for the items in O2, . . . , Ok. Hence, the
market clears for binary-reduced utilities for the original prices which contra-
dicts that the HZ solution under bi-valued utilities that is not an outcome of
HZ under binary-reduced utilities.
The remaining equivalences follow from Theorem 1 that EPS is equivalent
to the rules under 1-0 utilities.
Corollary 2. For all HZ solutions under bi-valued utilities, the solution is
rational, and each item gets the same price in all the solutions for problem
instances in which the underlying ordinal preferences do not change. For a
given problem instance with bi-valued utilities, each agent gets the same utility
in all the the solutions of the problem instance. Under bi-valued utilities, the
set of HZ solutions does not change even if the agents’ utilities are shifted or
scaled.
Proof. We have proved that HZ solutions under bi-valued utilities is equivalent
to applying the balancing operation to a CEEI solution (with respect to the
binary-reduced utilities). It is well-known that the CEEI solution is always
3The proof is also an alternative argument that HZ under bi-valued utilities is invariant
under scaling and shifting of the utility fuctions as their outcomes are equivalent to HZ under
1-0 utilities.
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rational and for th problem instance, each agent gets the same utility in all the
solutions of the instance and each item gets the same price in all the solutions
of the instance.
The theorem above also has the several algorithmic consequences. Firstly,
in order to compute the HZ solution for bi-valued utilities, one only needs to
consider the underlying dichotomous preferences and run the EPS algorithm!
The characterizations combined with the EPS algorithm provide an alternative
route to proving that the HZ solution can be computed in strongly polynomial
time.
Corollary 3. Under bi-valued utilities, the HZ solution can be computed in time
O(n3 logn).
Proof. Computing the HZ solution reduces to computing the outcome of the
EPS algorithm. The running time of EPS is O(n3 logn).
Another algorithmic consequence is a reduction from HZ to CEEI under the
case of bi-valued utilities.
Corollary 4. There is a linear-time reduction from computing the HZ solution
under bi-valued utilities to computing the MNW/CEEI/Leximin solution under
binary utilities.
Proof. The reduction is specified as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Reduction from HZ for bi-valued utilities to MNW/CEEI/leximin
Input: (N,O, u) where u is bi-valued
Output: A balanced assignment
1: Turn the bi-valued utilities u to binary reduced utilities u′.
2: Apply an algorithm for the (unconstrained) MNW/CEEI/leximin for utili-
ties u′ to compute a solution x
3: Apply the balancing operation on x to derive the HZ outcome.
4: return x.
5. Efficiency and Strategyproofness
We have already pointed out that in EPS, an agent who gets one unit of
most-preferred items, cannot get more even though he may be the only agent
liking the additional item. Due to the adherence to the size constrants, the
HZ solution may not be ex-ante Pareto optimal (PO) among the set of all
assignments if we assume that agents have additive utilities. However, it is
PO among all balanced assignments in which each agent gets exactly one unit
of items. Ex-ante Pareto optimality among balanced assignments follows from
the fact that each agent maximizes his utility among all allocations that are
balanced.
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Remark 1. The HZ solution is PO among the set of balanced assignments. It
may not be PO among the set of all assignments if we assume that agents have
additive utilities.
We recall that CEEI is equivalent to the MNW rule. However, the HZ rule is
not equivalent to maximizing Nash welfare while imposing equal size constraints.
This is evident from Example 1 that showed that applying MNW to balanced
assignments may give highly unfair assignments.
Next, we look at issues around strategyproofness and group-
strategyproofness. A rule is strategyproof if no agent can misreport her
preferences to get higher utility. A rule is ex-ante group-strategyproof if no
group of agents can misreport their preferences so that all agents get at least
as much utility and at least one agent gets strictly more utility.
For dichotomous preferences, EPS is ex-ante group-strategyproof (no group
of agents can misreport their preferences so that all agents get at least as much
utility and at least one agent gets strictly more utility). This fact has been
shown before as well (see, e.g. Theorem 1 of Katta and Sethuraman [12] who
refer to the argument by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6]). Group-strategyproofness
for EPS is established by induction on the bottleneck sets created: it can be
proved that no agent in a bottleneck set will be a member of a manipulating
coalition. Hence, it follows that the HZ solution is also group-strategyproof
under bi-valued utilities.4
Corollary 5. Under bi-valued utilities, the HZ rule is group-strategyproof.
For 1-0 utilities, all the rules leximin/MNW/CEEI that may return un-
balanced assignments are group-strategyproof as well. See for example The-
orem 3 of Aziz and Ye [4] that shows that leximin/MNW/CEEI are group-
strategyproof. Within the class of bi-valued utilities, it is clear that leximin is
not strategyproof or envy-free: an agent with scaled-down utilities get predom-
inant importance under the leximin rule. On the other hand, scaling down of
utilities has no effect in the case of MNW (equivalently CEEI). Despite resis-
tance to manipulation to scaling, we show that MNW is not strategyproof under
bi-valued utilities even if the underlying ordinal preferences remain unchanged.
Theorem 3. Under bi-valued utilities, MNW/CEEI is not strategyproof even
if the underlying ordinal preferences remain unchanged.
Proof. We provide an example with 5 agents and 5 items.
4The HZ rule is not strategyproof for general utilities. See, for example, further discussion
by Abebe et al. [1].
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a b c d e
1 10 1 1 1 1
2 6 6 10 6 6
3 4 10 4 10 4
4 0 0 0 0 1
5 0 0 0 0 1
Under the valuations, the MNW/CEEI outcome x is as follows.
a b c d e



1 1 0 0 0 0
2 0 1/12 1 1/12 0
3 0 11/12 0 11/12 0
4 0 0 0 0 1/2
5 0 0 0 0 1/2
Agent 1 gets utility 10.
Suppose agent 1 misreports as follows by raising her value for the lower
preferred items.
a b c d e
1 10 8 8 8 8
2 6 6 10 6 6
3 4 10 4 10 4
4 0 0 0 0 1
5 0 0 0 0 1
Under the misreport, the MNW/CEEI outcome y is as follows.
a b c d e



1 1 3/16 0 3/16 0
2 0 0 1 0 0
3 0 13/16 0 13/16 0
4 0 0 0 0 1/2
5 0 0 0 0 1/2
The assignment y gives agent 1 utility more than 10 with respect to her orig-
inal utilities. Hence, MNW/CEEI is not strategyproof under bi-valued utilities.
The theorem above can be recast in the context of indivisible goods to state
that for bi-valued utilities, the MNW rule of Caragiannis et al. [8] is not strat-
egyproof for any tie-breaking over the set of possible outcomes.
Corollary 6. Under bi-valued utilities, and for indivisible goods, the MNW rule
of Caragiannis et al. [8] is not strategyproof for any tie-breaking over the set of
possible outcomes.
The argument follows from the observation that each divisible good can be
approximately modelled as small enough multiple indivisible goods.
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